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1. Introduction 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) are “the rights to use and sell knowledge and inventions” 
(Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007: 541), with the aim of guaranteeing adequate returns for 
innovators and creators. There are different types of intellectual property protection 
(Granstrand, 2005): old types such as patents, trade secrets, copyrights, trademarks and 
design rights, and new forms such as breeding rights and database rights. Nonetheless, 
patents are commonly considered as the most important and representative IPR (e.g., Besen 
and Raskind, 1991).  
IPR have a long legal and economic history, since the idea of intellectual property was 
already present in ancient cultures such as Babylonia, Egypt, Greece and the Roman Empire. 
Mokyr (2009) discusses the relevance of the late 19th century, when political events created a 
system which supported an executive that was sufficiently well-organised to create a “rule 
of law” and respect private property rights. This argument emerges, in part, in the context 
of an Industrial Revolution marked by important technological improvements, whereby IPR 
began gradually to be accorded more respect.  
Despite this long history, only recently has IPR come to play a central role in debates 
concerning economic policy, being a stimulus for innovation through monopoly power 
(Menell, 1999). This change, related to the pro-patent era, only emerged in the 20th 
century – first in the USA and then globally in the world. Beneath this profound 
transformation lay a “deeper, more broad-based and much slower flow of events towards 
a more information- (knowledge) intensive and innovation-based economy” (Granstrand, 
2005: 266). Therefore, in this period, knowledge and information assumed an important 
role in economics, which implied important changes in policy-making both in developed 
and developing countries. 
The relationship between IPR, technological change and economic growth is ambiguous 
(e.g., Horii and Iwaisako, 2007; Harayuma, 2009; Panagopoulos, 2009). Although knowledge 
and innovation are crucial for economic growth (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; 
Hall and Rosenberg, 2010), if they are (completely) free there will be no incentive to invest in 
new knowledge and inventions (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1990). Thus, the potential need to 
protect both knowledge and inventions emerges, and the discussion of the importance of 
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IPR for this protection function gains relevance. In forming the decision whether to protect 
or not, a typical trade-off emerges: if we protect, only the owner of the knowledge design 
will use it (for some years she/he will have the monopoly power) and so the impact on 
economic growth will be smaller; in cases where no protection exists (which would allow 
innovators to be rewarded), knowledge will be easily diffused and all adopters will benefit 
from associated profits without having supported the corresponding costs; in the latter case 
no incentive to create new knowledge will exist. Thus a greater diffusion could have a 
higher economic growth impact, but at the same time the inexistence of a clear incentive 
could also reduce growth enhancement. This issue is only one of (the) several extant trade-
off debates concerning the IPR-economic growth relationship.  
The main purpose of this essay is to construct a survey of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the relationship between Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), technological 
change and economic growth, as well as to expose some of the gaps in the current research. 
The relevance of this task is directly related to the ambiguous role that the literature has 
identified relating to the relationship between these dimensions. After systematization of the 
relevant theoretical literature, we focus on the empirical studies concerning the effect of IPR 
protection on innovation and economic growth. In presenting this overview, we intend to 
analyse to what extent empirical results allow (for) a consensual conclusion, faced as we are 
with the ambiguity of the theoretical contributions. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. After a brief introduction, Section 2 presents an 
overview of the relationship between the economics of IPR, innovation and technological 
change. Section 3 focuses in detail on the relationship between endogenous economic 
growth and IPR from a theoretical perspective, whereas Section 4 offers an analysis of this 
relationship, but in empirical terms. Section 5 concludes, highlighting the main gaps that 
currently exist in this research agenda. 
2. The economics of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and innovation: An 
overview 
The conceptualization of IPR as a mean of protecting ideas is relatively recent. Several 
international agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and (the) World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) are examples of conventions and/or organizations 
connected with IPR (Senhoras, 2007). 
IPR, in their various forms, play a crucial role in innovation systems.1 Firms invest in 
innovation activities, find new products or new processes and increase their profits. To 
prevent the imitation of their innovations, firms can benefit from IPR protection. In this 
sense, IPR serve as an incentive for innovation, since knowledge has the characteristics of a 
public good (non-excludable and non-rival), and hence is easily appropriable. So in the case 
of IPR, the good is non-rival but becomes excludable. The significance of spillovers 
                                                 
1 Arrow (1962) was a pioneer in addressing the economics of IPR. However, early authors such as Adam 
Smith, John Stuart Mill and J. W. Goethe had already conceived the patent as a price society must pay 
for discovery, which was fundamental for the unfettered diffusion of useful knowledge. Furthermore, it 
had already been recognized that the complete specification of the patent made the technological details 
more accessible to others (Mokry, 2009). 
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associated with technological knowledge being widely recognized, the related literature 
clearly stresses the importance of property rights, patents and other policies designed to 
protect innovative firms from spillovers. Nevertheless, spillovers are crucial for technology 
transfer and development (e.g., Hall and Rosenberg, 2010). Hence, within this framework, a 
topic that is frequently discussed concerns the optimal patent length and the consequent 
trade-off between dynamic efficiency and static efficiency. 
IPR play an important role not only in the innovation system but also on structural 
dynamics across sectors and countries, and over time. Authors such as Langford (1997) 
conclude that, despite there being some disadvantages, one of the most important economic 
effects of IPR is that they induce innovation, increasing the possibilities of technology 
transfer.  
Resources, competences and dynamic capabilities are addressed within this wider broader 
discussion concerning appropriability. According to Hall and Rosenberg (2010: 689), 
“resources are firm-specific assets that are difficult, or impossible, to imitate. They are 
stocks, not flows.” Resources are most likely to be intangibles; they are not easily 
transferred, some examples being intellectual property rights and know how processes,. As 
regards competences, they “are a particular kind of organizational resource”, since “[t]hey 
result from activities that are performed repetitively or quasi-repetitively” (Hall and 
Rosenberg, 2010: 690). So routines are closely linked to competences. The firm’s resources 
are considered sources of advantage, and in this context IPR correspond to firm-specific, 
intangible resources, which are not easy to transfer to other firms because it is difficult or 
even impossible to imitate them.  
According to Mokyr (2009) and others, it is important to pay attention to the difference 
between institutions which stimulate technological progress and institutions that support 
the growth of markets by protecting property rights. In a completely unlegislated society, 
technological progress is less likely. Yet in order for rapid technological change to occur, it is 
necessary to eliminate some property rights. So this author is forced to ask “What kind of 
institutions encouraged technological progress?” (Mokyr, 2009: 349). He starts by 
emphasising the idea that incentives are a requirement for inventions and IPR offer 
incentives for successful inventors. Using the historical fact that the number of patents was 
stagnant until the mid- 18th century, and suddenly started growing in the 1750s, the author 
concludes that IPR show how institutions contributed to the origins of the Industrial 
Revolution. However, Mokyr also states that the main difficulty lies not in whether the 
patent system has a positive effect on technological progress in equilibrium but whether the 
effect could be sufficiently large to explain a considerable share of the acceleration in 
technological progress that it is intended to explain. Furthermore, it is interesting to know 
whether other institutions could have been similar to or even more important than the 
patent system. Mokyr (2009) concludes that, even as far as the historical importance of 
patents on the Industrial Revolution is concerned, the impact is not clear. 
Cozzi (2009) discusses the possibility of innovation and growth without IPR. His main [line 
of] reasoning is that, since the main engine of economic growth is innovation, IPR may not 
necessarily be crucial for innovation and growth. In other words, although the IPR regime 
allows innovators to be rewarded for their innovations, constituting a mechanism whereby 
they are stimulated to innovate , innovation is still possible in the absence of IPR through 
other means, such as education (see also Greennhalgh and Rogers, 2007). Furukawa (2007) 
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and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) also show that increasing patent protection against imitation 
has ambiguous effects on R&D and growth.  
Hence, we may question whether the rise in profits associated with a patent increases the 
incentive to innovate. Initially the answer would be that two incentives are better than just 
one (Cozzi, 2009). However, as Cozzi (2009) also mentions, Haruyama (2009) proves that 
this is not always the case, because in a very populated world, the introduction of IPR could 
have adverse effects on the skill premium, which could consequently lead to a reduction in 
the tacit knowledge incentive and intensify the expected capital loss resulting from 
obsolescence.  
The issue of appropriability is of course related to “profiting from the innovation 
framework” (Hall and Rosenberg, 2010: 698) and to Schumpeter’s concept of creative 
destruction. To guarantee profits from innovation efforts and to protect 
inventors/innovators from imitators, two possibilities are presented: strong natural 
protection and strong intellectual property protection, both of which are related to 
appropriability regimes (Hall and Rosenberg, 2010). Patents can also be a means of 
protecting inventors/innovators from their rivals and ensuring the generation of profits. 
However, the use of patents is considered imperfect because “they are especially ineffective 
at protecting process innovation”. This ineffectiveness is associated with e.g. the existence of 
considerable legal and financial requirements to prove they have been violated or with the 
presence of weak law enforcement relating to intellectual property (Hall and Rosenberg, 
2010: 700). Thus patents act as an incentive to innovate while at the same time possibly 
discouraging some innovators and therefore reducing knowledge spillovers (Panagopoulos, 
2009). Therefore, a concave relationship between patent protection and innovation may 
emerge, differing from the relationship advocated by Arrow (1962), which argues that 
stronger patent protection brings about leads to more innovations. 
In brief, some authors criticize the argument that strong patent protection offers greater 
incentives to innovators and therefore increases economic performance. Cohen et al. (2000) 
maintain that the increasing number of patents is not necessarily a sign of their greater 
effectiveness. Both empirical contributions such as those of Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and 
theoretical approaches such as those of O’Donaghue et al. (1988) lend support to this latter 
perspective. Moreover, as also stressed by Panagopoulos (2009), Horii and Iwaisako (2005) 
maintain that stronger intellectual property protection reduces the number of competitive 
sectors. Since it is easier to innovate in these sectors than in monopolistic sectors, this study 
advocates that the innovator tends to be concentrated in a smaller number of competitive 
sectors.  
Chu (2009b) studies the effects of IPR on the specific framework of macroeconomics. He 
stresses that since it is not possible to meet or recreate ideal situations in the real world, 
market failures can engender the overprovision or underprovision of certain resources. In 
fact, whereas the competitive market or Walrasian equilibriums are efficient, leading to the 
Pareto efficient allocation of resources, competitive conditions are difficult to come by in real 
economies. For example, investment in R&D activity has two implications in terms of 
returns: the social return and the private return. Empirical studies in this area (e.g., Jones 
and Williams, 1988, 2000) show that the social return to R&D is much higher than the 
private return. This being the case, R&D, innovation, economic growth and social welfare 
would increase towards the socially optimal level were market failure to be overcome. 
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Within this context, Chu (2009b) stresses the relevance of quantitative dynamic general-
equilibrium (DGE) analyses for studying the macroeconomic repercussions of rising IPR 
protection. He further emphasises that, although some empirical evidence points to a 
positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, this evidence appears to be 
stronger in the case of developed rather than developing countries. Hence, this author 
maintains that the optimal level of patent protection2 leads to a trade-off between the social 
benefits of improved innovation and the social costs of multiple distortions and income 
inequality. In an open economy, achieving the globally optimal level of protection demands 
international coordination rather than the harmonization of IPR protection.  
Another interesting question in terms of policy implications is the magnitude of welfare 
gains from changing the patent length towards its socially optimal level. Kwan and Lai 
(2003) found that the extension of a patent’s effective lifetime would lead to a significant 
increase in R&D and welfare. But Chu (2009a) maintains that while the extension of patent 
length beyond 20 years leads to a negligible increase in R&D and consumption, the 
limitation of the patent length leads to their significant reduction. So it seems that patent 
length is not an effective instrument for increasing R&D in most industries. In line with this 
argument, patent reform in the USA implemented in the 1980s focused on other aspects of 
patent rights such as patentability requirements (the invention would have to be new and 
non-obvious). Nevertheless, O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) also show that if the 
patentability requirements are lowered, there will be contrasting effects on R&D and 
innovation. On the one hand, it becomes easier for an inventor to obtain a patent, which 
increases the R&D incentives. On the other hand, the amount of profits generated by an 
invention would decrease due to its smaller quality improvement, so the possibility that the 
next invention is patentable takes away market share from the current invention, decreasing 
R&D incentives. The policy implication mentioned by Chu (2009b) is the ambiguous effect 
of lowering the patentability requirement on R&D and growth.  
Another instrument also discussed in Chu (2009b) is the patent breadth (the broadness or 
the scope of a patent) that determines the level of patent protection for an invention against 
imitation and subsequent innovations. There are two types of patent protection: the lagging 
breadth and the leading breadth. In relation to the former, Li (2001), using the Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) model, found a positive effect of the lagging breadth on R&D and 
growth; i.e. the increase in protection against imitation improves the incentives for R&D. 
This unambiguous positive effect emerges because larger lagging breadth allows (the) 
monopolists to charge a higher markup (Li, 2001).  
Chin (2007), Furukawa (2007) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) also show that the increase in 
patent protection against imitation exerts ambiguous effects on R&D and growth. Chu 
(2009b), basing his hypothesis on these three works, concludes that if IPR protection has 
asymmetric effects on different generations of households, it can also have a negative effect 
on innovation. Leading breadth is also discussed, underlining the point that increasing 
leading has opposite effects on the incentives for R&D. Once more, Chu (2009b) reports on 
                                                 
2 Relative to patent policy, there are some instruments that can be used to influence the incentives to 
R&D and innovation, to the extent that they will affect economic growth. One example of these 
instruments is the patent length that establishes the statutory term of patent. Judd (1985) cited in Chu 
(2009b) argues that the optimal patent length is infinite, whereas Futagami and Iwaisako (2003, 2007) 
maintain, in a version of the Romer model, that the optimal patent length is finite. 
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O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) and their analysis of Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) 
model, to show the following: while the profits generated by an invention increase due to 
the consolidation of market power through generations of inventors, leading to a positive 
effect on R&D, the delayed rewards from profit sharing occasion a lower present value of 
profits received by an inventor, thus bringing about a negative effect (the profit growth rate 
is lower than the interest rate). This negative effect is also known as blocking patents (Chu, 
2009b). 
To sum up, we can conclude from the analysis of the different studies discussed above that 
the relationship between IPR and economic performance is ambiguous.  
Although the codification of patents and copyright laws, as well as the regulation of 
privileges, emerged in the late 15th century, the concern with the relationship between IPR 
and economic growth only began in the 20th century, gathering pace as time went on. The 
first really relevant studies regarding IPR and growth emerged around the 1980s or even 
1990s,3 which corresponds with the emergence of the New Economic Growth Theory, also 
known as [the] Endogenous Economic Growth Theory, in the 1980s (Romer, 1994). The next 
section discusses and compares these two issues. 
3. The bridge between IPR and Endogenous Economic Growth: Main 
theoretical contributions
4
 
Innovation has assumed increasing importance in economic growth theory. In this context, 
it is consensually recognized as a crucial engine of growth (for example, Romer, 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992), and many studies have discussed the role of knowledge and 
technology in growth and development (e.g., Hall and Rosenberg, 2010).  
In particular, some authors focus their attention on the relation between IPR and growth. 
For instance, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) develop a model of North-South trade with 
multinational firms and economic growth in order to formally evaluate the effects of 
stronger IPR protection in developing countries. These effects have been the subject of 
intense debate, with one side advocating stronger IPR protection reform5and the other 
opposed to this (Taylor, 1994). 
The former view argues that the reform would promote innovation and benefit developing 
countries because it would contribute to more rapid economic growth and would accelerate 
the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries. The latter argues that 
stronger IPR protection would neither accelerate economic growth nor transfer international 
                                                 
3 Towse and Holzhauer (2002) have compiled a selection of the most important articles relating to the 
economics of intellectual property, and show that, in essence, they are of 20th century provenance, 
belonging in particular to the 1980s and 1990s. Additionally, on 29th September 2011, in a piece of 
internet research conducted in “SCOPUS”, using “Intellectual Property Rights” and “endogenous 
growth model” as search words (in all text) and collecting only journal articles (including reviews), we 
obtained 56 records, the first dating from 1991.  
4 The selection of these studies was based on Towse and Holzhauer (2002), Pejovich (2001), Cantwell 
(2006) and on a thorough search of related literature on several international bibliographic databases, 
including Econlit and Scopus.  
5 This reform emerged from the Uruguay Round in 1994, more specifically from the TRIPS agreement, 
whose aim was to establish minimum standards of IPR protection by all WTO members up to 2006. 
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technology more quickly, since it only “results in the transfer of rents to multinational 
corporate patent holders headquartered in the world’s most advanced countries especially 
in the US” (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010: 13). 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) also offer an overview of several contributions focusing 
on multinationals and relating to this issue. Glass and Saggi (2002), Sener (2006) and Glass 
and Wu (2007) show an unambiguous relation(ship) between strong IPR protection in the 
South and a lower rate of technology transfer, while Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Branstetter 
et al. (2006) and Branstetter et al. (2007) reach the opposite conclusion. However, it is worth 
mentioning that, in all those previous models, the absence of R&D spending by affiliates, 
which is not empirically sustained (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010) is assumed. 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010: 14), in an effort to be coherent in considering this 
empirical evidence, consider that “R&D conducted by the affiliates in developing countries 
is focused on the absorption of patent-firm technology and on its modification for local 
markets.” This study finds a positive relationship between stronger IPR in the South and a 
permanent increase in the rate of technology transfer from the North to the South. 
Additionally, this strong protection in the South results in a temporary increase in the 
Northern innovation rate and in a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap. Hence, 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) conclude that, under these conditions, Southern strong 
IPR protection promotes innovation in the global economy and this explains the faster 
growth of several developing countries compared with the growth performance of typical 
developed countries. 
Moreover, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) analyze the long-term welfare effects, and at 
this level some contradictions emerge. In some North-South trade models, such as those 
proposed by Lai (1998), Branstetter et al. (2007) and Glass and Wu (2007), patent reform 
increases the economic growth rate permanently (and therefore the consumers must be 
better than they would be without patent reform). In other models, such as in Glass and 
Saggi (2002) and Sener (2006), patent reform permanently decreases the economic growth 
rate (and consequently consumers must be worse). In Dinopoulos and Segerstrom’s (2010) 
model, growth is semi-endogenous and so the long-term welfare effects are ambiguous, 
because patent reform does not permanently alter the economic growth rate. Nevertheless, 
by combining all the effects gleaned from the related literature, the authors find optimistic 
long-term welfare effects in those developing countries with strong IPR protection. 
Moreover, as regards the two possible ways of transferring technology between two 
countries, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and imitation, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010: 
15) argue that “the effects of stronger IPR protection would depend on how important each 
mode of technology transfer is.” 
Regarding IPR protection in an open economy, Chu (2009b) emphasises three main results 
derived from Lai and Qui (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004). The first indicates that, 
due to the asymmetries in terms of innovation capability, developed/northern countries 
would [tend to] choose a higher level of IPR protection than developing/southern 
countries. The second underlines the fact that if the North’s level of IPR protection, such 
as TRIPS, were imposed on (the) southern countries, it would lead to a welfare gain (loss) 
in the North (South). And finally, although TRIPS require the harmonization of IPR 
protection, this harmonization is neither necessary nor sufficient for the maximization of 
global welfare.  
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Chu and Peng (2009), quoted by Chu (2009b), also consider the effects of IPR protection on 
income inequality across countries and find that stronger patent rights in one country tend 
to lead to an increase in economic growth and income inequality both in domestic and 
foreign countries. Another result of this research is that TRIPS tend to improve or reduce 
global welfare according to the domestic importance of foreign goods. Thus, only if these 
goods were sufficiently important for domestic consumption would the harmonization of 
IPR protection that the TRIPS require improve global welfare. 
Cozzi (2009) also highlights the role of IPR in economic growth in both developed and 
developing countries. Typically, while the developed countries are the northern countries, 
which create new varieties of goods and services, the developing countries are the southern 
countries, which have a production cost advantage. In this sense, the source of growth is the 
horizontal innovation of new intermediate products. In the case of northern firms, they may 
export (the) intermediate goods, they may directly invest in the South (through knowledge 
transfer), or they may grant a licence for their product (complete transfer). These firms 
desire to transfer the maximum possible knowledge, but this implies the transfer of more 
knowledge about their patented goods. The southern firms can try to undertake costly 
imitation activities, so that in the South IPR protection is not complete: the more intensive is 
the knowledge transfer, the higher is the probability of southern firms imitating their 
northern counterparts. The greater is the IPR protection, the higher is the equilibrium FDI,6 
which makes it possible to improve the international division of labour. Thus, while very 
high IPR protection implies licensing - this method being the most efficient - very low IPR 
protection induces the firms of the North not to transfer at all, but to produce domestically 
and to export their intermediate goods to the South. The advantage of this last situation is 
the absence of unproductive Southern imitation costs. Cozzi (2009) also maintains that 
different IPR effects can exist: the combination of the general equilibrium effects of adverse 
incentives and wasteful imitation costs implies that the increase in international IPR 
protection is beneficial to the welfare of the South if the initial level of IPR is already above a 
certain threshold. However, in the case of weak protection of initial IPR, the increase in 
protection might be dangerous for (the) southern consumers.  
Globalization, inequality and innovation are phenomena crucially associated with IPR. 
Spinesi (2009) extended Dinopoulos and Segerstrom’s (1999) work on Schumpeterian 
economic growth, by studying the relations between all those dimensions. Among others 
issues, Spinesi emphasises that IPR achieve a similar result even in the presence of constant 
returns to scale. This result is advantageous because it would also apply in the case of firms 
competing a la Bertrand. Moreover, he finds that, while horizontal innovation has a positive 
level effect, it is vertical innovation that sustains the growth effect. 
Panagopoulos (2009) explores the relationship between patent breadth and growth, by 
studying how patent breadth affects innovation and output. This study finds an inverse U 
relationship between patent protection and growth.  
From the different studies mentioned above, we conclude that there is no consensus 
regarding the relationship between IPR and economic growth, including within the specific 
theoretical framework of endogenous growth literature. In Table 1 we offer a 
systematization of this theoretical literature.  
                                                 
6 The relationship between IPR protection and FDI is also analyzed by Chu (2009b): technological 
transfer between northern and southern firms occurs to a significant extent via FDI. 
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IPR conceptualization Author (date) Net final effect 
Patents 
Scherer (1997); Koléda 
(2008) 
On innovation: 0  
Tandon (1982); David 
and Olsen (1992) 
On welfare: + 
Merges and Nelson 
(1994) 
On technological progress: - 
Taylor (1994) 
On economic growth: + (symmetric 
protection) and – (asymmetric 
protection). 
Michel and Nyssen 
(1998); Goh and 
Oliver (2002); 
Iwaisako and 
Futagami (2003) 
On economic growth: +  
Futagami and 
Iwaisako (2007) 
On economic growth: + (finite patent 
length) and – (infinite patent length); 
a patent strategy with a finite patent 
length is optimal. 
Naghavi (2007) 
On South welfare: + (if attract foreign 
investment in less R&D intensive 
industries or if they stimulate 
innovation in high technology 
sectors). 
Dinopoulos and 
Kottaridi (2008) 
On economic growth and on income 
distribution: + (if each country selects 
the level of patent enforcement 
optimally, with the North having an 
incentive to choose stronger IPR 
protection than the South).  
Eicher and Garcia-
Peñalosa (2008); Chu 
(2009a) 
On economic growth: 0  
Panagopoulos (2009) 
On economic growth: a concave 
relationship.  
Index of Patent Rights from 
Park (2008) 
Chu (2010) 
On economic growth: +; on income 
inequality: 0  
Patent length and breadth; 
protection trademarks; 
copyrights and trade secrets; 
and the degree of 
enforcement. 
Kwan and Lai (2003)  
On economic growth: optimal degree 
of IPR protection.  
Copyright  
Novos and Waldman 
(1984) 
On social welfare: +  
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IPR conceptualization Author (date) Net final effect 
Landes and Posner 
(1989) 
On welfare associated with a given 
work: -  
Patent length and breadth; 
copyright policy  
Furukawa (2007) 
 
On economic growth: - (when the 
impact of accumulated experience on 
productivity is large enough, an 
inverted U relationship is suggested). 
Increase in imitation costs 
Stryszowski (2006)  
On economic growth in 
technologically lagging countries: 0  
Glass and Saggi 
(2002); Mondal and 
Gupta (2008)  
On innovation and on FDI: -  
Mondal and Gupta 
(2009); Connolly and 
Valderrama (2005) 
On welfare: + (both in North and in 
South, although the marginal welfare 
gain is higher in the former than in 
the latter) 
Wu (2010) On innovation: +  
Tariffs; Increase in the costs 
of imitation 
 
Datta and Mohtadi 
(2006) 
On South’s economic growth: tariffs (-
); IPR (-) 
Imitation intensity 
Mondal and Gupta 
(2006); Glass and Wu 
(2007); Zhou (2009) 
On innovation: 0  
Dinopoulos and 
Segerstrom (2010)  
On innovation: +  
Imitation probability and the 
return of innovation. 
 
Horii and Iwaisako 
(2007) 
On economic growth: 0  
Royalties  Saint –Paul (2008) On welfare: + 
N/a Furukawa (2010) On innovation: inverted U  
N/a: not applicable; 0: ambiguous or inconclusive net effect; +(-): positive (negative) net effect. 
Own elaboration. 
Table 1. The impact of IPR on innovation and growth: a synthesis of the theoretical literature 
As mentioned above, the relevant theoretical literature points to both positive and negative 
effects of patent protection on innovation (Chu, 2009b). For example, Furukawa (2007) and 
Eicher and Garcia-Peñalosa (2008) refute the idea that stronger IPR protection is always 
better. Using an endogenous growth model with costless imitation, Furukawa (2007) proves 
that IPR protection cannot increase economic growth, whereas Eicher and Garcia-Peñalosa 
(2008) support the idea that the relationship between IPR and economic growth is 
ambiguous. Iwaisako and Futagami (2003), Mondal and Gupta (2006) and Futagami and 
Iwaisako (2007) identify two opposite effects on this relationship. Wu (2010) presents 
inconclusive results that depend on such features as the countries’ level of development or 
the channel of technology transfer. Scherer (1977) also maintains that patents involve an 
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impact that depends on such factors as the market position of the innovator, the features of 
the technology (whether it is easy or difficult for it to be imitated), the cost, the risks and the 
potential payoffs from innovation. Furukawa (2010) and Panagopoulos (2009) find an 
inverted U relationship between IPR protection and innovation (and economic growth). 
Kwan and Lai (2003) and Connolly and Valderrama (2005) argue that IPR are important to 
R&D investment and (to) welfare.  
Table 1 is also helpful in showing that different authors use different concepts of IPR. 
Some of them (Scherer, 1997; Tandon, 1982; David and Olsen, 1992; Merges and Nelson, 
1994; Taylor, 1994; Michel and Nyssen, 1998; Goh and Oliver, 2002; Iwaisako and 
Futagami, 2003; Futagami and Iwaisako, 2007; Naghavi, 2007; Dinopoulos and Kottaridi, 
2008; Naghavi, 2007; Dinopoulos and Kottaridi, 2008; Eicher and Garcia-Peñalosa, 2008; 
Koléda, 2008; Chu, 2009a; Panagopoulos, 2009) limit the definition of IPR to one of their 
forms – patents (considered as the most important form of IPR, as discussed above). 
Others use distinct definitions, e.g. Glass and Saggi (2002) and Mondal and Gupta (2008, 
2009), who define IPR as the rise in the imitation cost. Connolly and Valderrama (2005) 
give a similar definition, assuming that imitators pay a licence fee which is similar to an 
increase in the fixed cost of the imitative research; Kwan and Lai (2003) consider IPR part 
of the imitation rate which can be influenced by some factors such as patents, trademarks, 
copyrights and trade secrets; Furukawa (2007) also defines IPR as a mixed measure of 
patent and copyright; Glass and Wu (2007) associate the measure of IPR with (the) 
imitation intensity, whereas Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) define IPR as a reduction 
in the exogenous rate of imitation. 
Despite these different ways of defining IPR, we do not find evidence of significant 
differences in terms of the results obtained. In fact, we have two studies in the table that 
achieve the same results using different measures of IPR: Furukawa (2007) and 
Panagopoulos (2009). Both suggest an inverted U relationship between IPR and economic 
growth, although the former defines IPR as a mix of patent and copyright measures, while 
the latter defines IPR only as patents. Furukawa (2010) also finds the same relationship, 
although he does not define IPR.  
Two of the articles in Table 1, Stryszowski (2006) and Mondal and Gupta (2008), compare 
their assumptions and/or conclusions with other studies – some of them also analyzed in 
the present work. Stryszowski (2006) identifies and discusses studies which maintain that 
strong IPR protection is beneficial for (the) innovating economies (e.g., Connolly and 
Valderrama, 2005). However, this study also highlights works that have found negative 
effects of IPR protection on lagging economies, based on the existence of a mechanism in 
which strong IPR protection tends to raise consumer prices and to diminish trade benefits 
that could be essential for developing economies (for example, Hekpman, 1993). Mondal 
and Gupta (2008) discuss several studies based on their distinct assumptions concerning the 
innovation framework (quality ladder framework versus product variety framework), and 
the alternative ways of treating imitation and of strengthening IPR protection, etc. Following 
this they present the assumptions of their own model, characterized by the use of a product 
variety model, a North-South model with endogenous innovation, imitation and 
multinationalisation, where innovation activities are set as costly and there is an 
endogenous rate of imitation. Lai (1998) gives a close approximation to this latter one, except 
for two features: the endogenous imitation rate in the South, given that imitation is 
considered costly; and the introduction of two kinds of labour in the South – skilled and 
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unskilled. In line with these two distinct assumptions, the results achieved are also different 
from Mondal and Gupta’s (2008). 
To sum up, we can state that the studies presented in Table 1 do not show a pattern 
regarding the relationship between IPR and economic growth (via welfare, for instance). 
From this table we can also state that patents are the most widely used measure of IPR in 
theoretical works. Hence, at this stage, we state the existence of two main gaps in this 
literature: the scarcity of studies, so that a potential research line would be to dig more 
deeply in this field; and the excessive focus on patents as an IPR measure, which neglects 
the potential impact of other instruments, such as copyrights, which are crucial for the 
development of specific ICT industries such as information technology and software. 
In the next section we develop an analysis of the empirical studies concerning this same 
relation(ship) between IPR and endogenous economic growth. 
4. IPR and Endogenous Economic Growth: Where do we stand? Insights 
from the empirical literature 
After the systematization of the relevant theoretical literature in the previous section, we 
focus on empirical studies into the effect of IPR protection on innovation and on economic 
growth. In this review (cf. Table 2), we intend to show whether the empirical results permit 
us to reach a sustainable conclusion, faced as we are with the confirmed ambiguity of the 
theoretical contributions. 
As we have seen above, according to the theoretical literature, patent protection generally 
has positive and negative effects on innovation (e.g., Chu, 2009b). However, empirical 
studies usually find a positive effect, which according to Chu (2009b) is explained by the 
domination of the positive effects over the negative ones. As we can see in Table 2, the 
empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, 
although with some ‘restrictions’ in the sample. For instance, the positive result is true only 
for developing countries (Falvey et al., 2009; Chen and Puttitanun, 2005). At a first glance, 
we could expect the opposite result. However, while some works, for example Park (2005) 
and Kanwar and Evenson (2003), generally find a positive effect, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) 
explain that, on the one hand, lower IPR can facilitate imitation, while on the other hand, 
innovation in developing countries increases in proportion to greater IPR protection. 
Moreover, these authors state that the optimal degree of IPR protection may depend on the 
country’s development level. Furthermore, Falvey et al. (2006) find evidence of a positive 
effect between IPR and economic growth for both low and high-income countries, but not 
for middle-income countries. According to the latter, the positive relation between IPR and 
economic growth in low-income countries cannot be explained by the potential fostering of 
R&D and innovation, but by the idea that stronger IPR protection promotes imports and 
inner FDI from high-income countries without negatively affecting the national industry 
based on imitation. 
Hence, when the division between developed and developing countries is considered, the 
effects of patent rights on R&D are rendered ambiguous: for instance, according to Chen 
and Puttitanun (2005), in developing countries there is a positive and significant relationship 
between IPR protection and innovation, while according to Park (2005), there is an 
insignificant effect of IPR protection on R&D.  
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Measure of IPR Methodology Sample 
Author 
(date) 
Net 
estimated 
effect 
Park and Ginarte 
(1997) Index of 
Patent Rights7 
Econometric 
analysis – 
Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regressions 
(SUR) 
Cross-section of countries for the 
period 1960-1990.  
Park and 
Ginarte 
(1997) 
+  
Econometric 
analysis – cross 
section  
48 countries for the period 1980 and 
2000 (Sources: World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) and 
Penn World Table 6.1) 
Xu and 
Chiang 
(2005) 
Econometric 
analysis – panel 
data 
64 developing countries over the 1975–
2000 period (Sources: World 
Development Indicators and Statistical 
Yearbook by UNESCO (UNESCO, 
1995, 1997, 2000); patent data come 
from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office Website) 
Chen and 
Puttitanun 
(2005) 
79 countries and four sub-periods: 
1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89 and 1990-
94.  
Falvey et al. 
(2006) 
+ (for low-
income and 
high-income 
countries) 
80 countries for the period 1970–1995. 
(Sources: PennWorld TableMark 6.1, 
updated version of Summers and 
Heston, 1991; UNCTAD, 2005; World 
Bank, 2005; Ginarte and Park, 1995; 
Easterly and Sewadeh, 2005; Hall and 
Jones, 1999; and Barro and Lee, 2000).
Groizard 
(2009) 
Ambiguous: 
+ 
(FDI is 
higher for 
countries 
with stronger 
intellectual 
property 
protection). 
- 
(Negative 
relationship 
between IPR 
and human 
capital 
indicators). 
                                                 
7 This index is a simple sum of the scores attributed to each of the five categories of patent rights (score 
from 0 to 1) on a scale of 0 to 5, with a larger number indicating stronger patent rights. The five IPR 
categories are the patent duration, the coverage, the enforcement mechanisms, the restrictions on patent 
scope and the membership in international treaties. 
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Measure of IPR Methodology Sample 
Author 
(date) 
Net 
estimated 
effect 
69 developed and developing 
countries over the period 1970–1999 
(Sources: World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, 2001, Jon 
Haveman website, OECD’s 
International Trade by Commodity 
Statistic (Historical Series, 1961–
1990), International Trade by 
Commodity Statistic (1990–1999), and 
Barro and Lee (2001) database. 
Falvey et al. 
(2009) 
Non-linear: 
(Depends on 
level of 
development, 
the imitative 
ability and 
the market 
size of the 
importing 
country). 
Park and Ginarte 
(1997) Index 
extended by Park 
(2008a) 
Econometric 
analysis 
50 countries (Sources: Ginarte and 
Park, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1995; 
Hofstede, 1984 and UNESCO, 1998). 
Varsakelis 
(2001) 
+ 
32 countries for the period between 
1981 and 1990 (Sources: Ginart and 
Park, 1997; Esty et al., 1998; United 
Nations, 1999; Word Bank, 2000; 
Barro and Lee, 2000; Heston et al., 
2001 and Pick’s Currency Yearbook 
and World Currency Yearbook, 
several years). 
Kanwar 
and 
Evenson 
(2003) 
Eight indexes:8 
index of patent 
rights constructed 
from Ginart and 
Park (1997) and 
Park and Wagh 
(2002); index of 
copyrights; index 
of trade-marks; 
index of parallel 
import protection; 
index of software 
rights; index of 
piracy rates; index 
of enforcement 
provisions and 
index of 
enforcement in 
practice.  
41 countries (Sources: Penn World 
Tables (Version 5.6a), World Bank 
Development Indicators and 
UNESCO’s Statistical Yearbook). 
Park (2005) 
                                                 
8 For the first three indexes (relative to patents, copyrights and trade-marks) the index consists of four 
sub-categories: coverage, duration, restrictions and membership in international treaties. Enforcement 
can also be included as a sub-category (such as in Ginarte and Park, 1997) but it was considered useful 
to separate this sub-category and treat it as another index. 
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Measure of IPR Methodology Sample 
Author 
(date) 
Net 
estimated 
effect 
Patent rights index 
data (Park, 2001) 
Semiparametric 
model 
21 countries for the period 1981 and 
1997 (Sources: World Bank World 
Development Indicators, 1999; and 
UNESCO). 
Alvi et al. 
(2007) 
Patents  
Econometric 
analysis 
Firms in the chemical, drug, 
electronics and machinery industries 
Mansfield 
et al (1981) 
Japanese and U. S. patent data on 307 
Japanese firms (Sources: Japan 
Development Bank Corporate 
Finance Database, Kaisha Shiki Ho 
R&D, JAPIO, CASSIS CD-ROM, RAI 
patent database and Hoshi and 
Kashyap, 1990). 
Sakakibara 
and 
Branstetter 
(2001) 
0 
4 countries (manufacturing sector 
divided into 12 subgroups) between 
1990 and 2001 (Sources: OECD 
STAN, EPO and PERINORM). 
Blind and 
Jungmittag 
(2008) 
+ 
Impact of patent 
reform9 
16 countries over the 1982-1999 
period (Sources: U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) Survey; 
World Intellectual Property Rights 
Organization (WIPO)). 
Branstetter 
et al. (2005) 
N/a (property 
rights) 
68 developed and developing 
countries between 1976 and 1985 
(Sources: World Development Report 
1988, Summers and Heston, 1988; 
World Bank, 1990; and Scully and 
Slottje, 1991). 
Torstensson 
(1994) 
N/a: not applicable; 0: ambiguous or inconclusive net effect; +(-): positive (negative) net effect.  
Own elaboration.  
Table 2. The impact of IPR on innovation and growth: a synthesis of the empirical literature 
Chu (2009b), in giving a plausible explanation for this contrast emanating from empirical 
analyses, points to the fact that developed countries are typically close to the technology 
frontier, and that consequently economic growth in these countries requires original 
innovations, while developing countries are normally further away from the technology 
frontier, thus enabling economic growth to be driven by the reverse engineering of foreign 
technologies. Therefore, stronger patent rights, which discourage the reverse engineering of 
foreign technologies, can asphyxiate the innovation process in developing countries. Chu 
                                                 
9 “Each reform can be classified according to whether or not it expanded or strengthened patent rights 
along five dimensions: 1) an expansion in the range of goods eligible for patent protection, 2) an 
expansion in the effective scope of patent protection, 3) an increase in the length of patent protection, 4) 
an improvement in the enforcement of patent rights, and 5) an improvement in the administration of 
the patent system.” (Branstetter et al., 2006: 14). 
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(2009b) emphasises that the increase in the level of patent protection by policymakers is 
similar to giving more market power to monopolists, which intensifies the deadweight loss. 
He recalls Nordhaus’ (1969) contribution in stating that the optimal level of patent 
protection should trade-off the harmful effects of IPR protection on society, even when 
stronger patent rights are growth-enhancing, against the welfare gain from innovation. 
Hence, distortionary effects of IPR protection could emerge. The latter author also 
emphasizes that, when skilled and unskilled workers are assumed, (the) strong patent 
protection increases the return to R&D and the wage of R&D workers.  
Through analysing the net effect of the IPR on economic growth we can state that it is not 
easy unequivocally to draw conclusions regarding the sign of that effect, despite the 
prevalence of the positive sign (cf. Table 2). We find evidence of both a positive sign and a 
negative sign. Possible explanations, beyond the focus on a patent index for measuring IPR 
(as also highlighted by Chu, 2009b, which mentions that it is not clear how each type of 
patent rights influences innovation on empirical grounds), are: the fact that some studies do 
not analyze the direct effect between IPR and economic growth; the adoption of different 
methodologies and of distinct samples. Hence, the gaps already mentioned when discussing 
the theoretical contributions clearly emerge here in association with the empirical studies. 
Once again, insufficient analysis, even more striking at the empirical level, and the excessive 
focus on patents as means of IPR measurement are evident. 
5. Conclusion 
This study supports the conclusion that there is no clear relationship between IPR and 
economic growth. Theoretical literature indicates that IPR protection has positive, negative 
or even ambiguous (or inconclusive) effects on innovation. 
After a thorough review of this theoretical literature it has been possible to identify some gaps 
in the research agenda. Firstly, in general, this research does not study the direct and net effect 
of IPR on economic growth. In fact it only analyzes the relationship between IPR-induced 
factors and economic growth, or the impact of IPR on other economic indicators such as 
welfare, technological change, FDI, R&D, innovation, etc.. This happens because a standard 
argumentation is adopted, maintaining a strict relation between these elements and economic 
growth. For instance, Mondal and Gupta (2006: 27) point out that “[t]echnological change 
plays the most important role in determining a country’s rate of economic growth. 
Strengthening the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) is an important factor that motivates 
technological change”. Furthermore, Koléda (2002: 1) argues that “[i]nnovation is an important 
source of economic growth”. Mansfield (1986: 173) holds that “[t]he patent system is at the 
heart of our nation’s policies toward technological innovation.” Secondly, there is a 
disproportionate focus on patent measurement as a proxy for IPR, and thirdly, it is clear that 
there is a scarcity of studies in this field , particularly in empirical terms. 
Despite the divergence of results regarding theoretical studies, most empirical studies find a 
net positive effect, which means that positive effects of IPR protection outweigh the negative 
effects. A possible explanation for this is that the empirical measure of patent protection, 
which is typically used, is just a summary of the statistics relating to the different categories 
of patent rights and so it is not clear how each type of patent rights influences innovation on 
empirical grounds (Chu, 2009b). 
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From the above, we consider that more research on this specific topic is crucial in order to 
further advance our understanding of the relation(ship) between IPR and economic growth 
on a worldwide scale, and to be able clearly to go beyond the strict modelling frame. 
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range of governmental policies (science and technology policy, innovation policy, macroeconomic
policy,competition policy, etc.), historical specificities, etc. Given that technology is explicitly taken up in the
strategies and policies of governments and firms, and new actors both in the national and international arenas
become involved, understanding the nature and dynamics of technology is on demand. I anticipate that this
book will decisively contribute in this regard.
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